Security Baseline

Establish the security floor for any production website or web app. Stack-agnostic. Covers the things that should be in place before public launch and verified periodically after.

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When to use

• Pre-launch security review
• Setting up a new site or environment
• Periodic security audit (quarterly recommended)
• Onboarding a new vendor or third-party integration
• Responding to a security finding or report
• Hardening after an incident

When NOT to use

• Active incident response (use incident-response)
• Code-level security review (use code-review-web)
• Email-specific authentication (SPF/DKIM/DMARC) (use email-deliverability)
• DNS-level security (CAA, DNSSEC) (use domain-strategy)
• Performance-related security (DDoS protection sizing) (use performance-optimization)

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Required inputs

• The site or app in scope (URLs, environments)
• The hosting platform and CDN
• Authentication method (if any)
• Third-party scripts and integrations
• Compliance context (PCI, SOC2, GDPR, etc., if applicable)
• Existing security tooling

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The framework: 6 layers

Security is layered. Each layer addresses a different attack surface.

Layer 1: Transport security

How data moves from server to client.

• HTTPS everywhere. No HTTP variants serving content.
• TLS 1.2 minimum, TLS 1.3 preferred. Disable TLS 1.0 and 1.1.
• HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header set, with includeSubDomains and preload for high-confidence sites.
• Strong cipher suites only. Modern browsers handle this if you pick a modern config from your provider.
• Certificates from a trusted CA, monitored for expiration.

Layer 2: Response headers

What the browser is told about your site.

Header	Purpose	Default value
Strict-Transport-Security	Force HTTPS	max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
Content-Security-Policy	Restrict resource loading	Site-specific
X-Content-Type-Options	Prevent MIME sniffing	nosniff
X-Frame-Options	Clickjacking protection	DENY or SAMEORIGIN
Referrer-Policy	Control referrer info	strict-origin-when-cross-origin
Permissions-Policy	Control browser features	Site-specific (camera, mic, etc.)
Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy	Process isolation	same-origin (where compatible)
Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy	Cross-origin restrictions	require-corp (where applicable)

CSP deserves its own attention. See the framework section below.

Layer 3: Authentication and authorization

How users prove who they are and what they can do.

• Strong password requirements (length over complexity rules; allow long passphrases)
• Account lockout or rate limiting on login
• 2FA available, required for admin accounts
• Session tokens: short-lived, secure, HttpOnly cookies
• Logout invalidates tokens server-side, not just client-side
• Password reset flows that don't reveal account existence
• Authorization checked on every request (don't rely on UI hiding)

Layer 4: Input handling

How untrusted input is processed.

• Validate on the server (client validation is UX, not security)
• Parameterized queries for any database access (no string concatenation into SQL)
• Output encoding by context (HTML, JS, URL, CSS)
• File upload restrictions (type, size, location, scanning)
• Rate limiting on endpoints that could be abused
• CSRF tokens on state-changing requests

Layer 5: Secrets management

Where credentials and keys live.

• No secrets in code, config files in repos, or environment variables baked into images
• Secrets in a dedicated secrets manager
• Different secrets per environment (no shared dev/prod secrets)
• Rotation schedule documented and followed
• Audit log of secret access
• Limited blast radius (each service has its own credentials, scoped narrowly)

Layer 6: Operational security

How the team operates.

• Access controls reviewed quarterly (offboard immediately on departure)
• 2FA enforced on every admin account (hosting, DNS, registrar, code host, deploy tools)
• Audit logs enabled and reviewed
• Vulnerability scanning (dependencies, containers, infrastructure)
• Patch cadence defined
• Incident response runbook exists (see incident-response)
• Backups exist and are tested (see backup-and-disaster-recovery)
• Security contact published (security.txt at /.well-known/security.txt)

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Content Security Policy

CSP is the most powerful response header and the most often misconfigured. Worth its own treatment.

What CSP does

CSP tells the browser which sources are allowed for various resource types: scripts, styles, images, frames, connections, etc. A strict CSP prevents most XSS attacks even when input handling has bugs.

Two flavors

Strict CSP (recommended): uses nonce- or hash- based source allowlists. Inline scripts must be explicitly allowed via nonce.

Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' 'nonce-{random}' 'strict-dynamic'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self';

Allowlist CSP (legacy): lists allowed domains. Easier to set up, much weaker.

Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' https://trusted.com; ...

Strict CSP requires application changes (every inline script needs a nonce). The investment pays off.

Roll out CSP gradually

1. Start with Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only to log violations without blocking.
2. Set up a violation report endpoint.
3. Watch for legitimate violations (third-party scripts, inline handlers).
4. Tune the policy.
5. Switch to enforcing mode once violations are mostly false positives.
6. Continue monitoring violation reports for new issues.

Common CSP mistakes

• unsafe-inline in script-src. Defeats most of CSP's value.
• unsafe-eval in script-src. Often required by older libraries; refactor or replace.
• Wildcard sources (*). Defeats the policy.
• Allowing CDNs that host arbitrary user content. Attackers can upload scripts to the CDN.
• Not restricting frame-ancestors. Use this for clickjacking defense (more flexible than X-Frame-Options).

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Workflow

Step 1: Run a baseline scan

Use a free scanner: securityheaders.com, observatory.mozilla.org. Get a current grade. This is the floor.

Step 2: Inventory the surface

• Domains and subdomains in scope
• Public endpoints (forms, APIs)
• Authentication entry points
• Admin interfaces
• Third-party integrations and their permissions

Step 3: Audit each layer

Walk the 6 layers. For each, document:

• What's in place
• What's missing
• Risk level (high, medium, low)

Step 4: Prioritize

High risk, easy fixes go first:

• HSTS not set
• Default headers missing
• Admin without 2FA
• Old TLS versions enabled

Medium risk, medium fixes next:

• CSP rollout
• Input validation gaps
• Secret management improvements

Low risk, nice-to-haves last:

• Permissions-Policy refinements
• Optional headers (Cross-Origin-* family)

Step 5: Implement and verify

For each fix:

• Make the change
• Test in a non-production environment
• Verify with a scanner
• Roll out
• Re-verify in production

Step 6: Set up monitoring

• Certificate expiration alerts
• CSP violation reporting
• Failed login monitoring
• Unusual admin activity alerts
• Dependency vulnerability alerts (Dependabot, Snyk, or equivalent)

Step 7: Document the baseline

Write a security baseline document. It says what's expected on every site:

• Required headers
• Required configurations
• Required practices

New sites get audited against this. Existing sites get re-audited periodically.

Step 8: Schedule review

Quarterly is the floor. Add reviews after major changes or incidents.

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Common compliance touchpoints

Not legal advice. Surfaces where security baseline meets compliance requirements:

• PCI DSS (if handling payment cards): much more involved than baseline. The baseline is a starting point, not sufficient.
• SOC 2: baseline aligns with most CC controls (CC6 series). Documented baseline plus evidence of execution is the audit ask.
• GDPR / privacy regs: baseline supports security obligations (Article 32). Privacy is broader than security.
• HIPAA, HITRUST, FedRAMP: baseline is necessary, far from sufficient. Get specialized help.

When compliance applies, the baseline is necessary but not the full answer.

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Failure patterns

HSTS without includeSubDomains. Attacker tricks browser into HTTP on a subdomain you haven't HTTPS'd yet.

HSTS preload without commitment. Once preloaded, removing it takes weeks. Don't preload until HTTPS is solid across all subdomains forever.

CSP with unsafe-inline. Defeats most of CSP. Either go strict (nonce-based) or accept that CSP is providing limited protection.

Default headers missing. X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, Referrer-Policy are easy and free. Set them.

Admin without 2FA. The single most common high-impact vulnerability across small teams. Fix today.

Secrets in environment variables baked into images. Anyone with image access has the secrets. Use a runtime secret manager.

No security.txt. Researchers find issues; they need somewhere to report. Publish a security.txt at /.well-known/security.txt.

Old TLS versions enabled. Disable TLS 1.0 and 1.1. Most providers offer this as a checkbox.

CDN allowing arbitrary inline scripts via misconfigured CSP. The CDN proxies user content; attackers leverage that. Audit the CSP against actual loaded resources.

No incident response plan. When (not if) something happens, no runbook = chaos. See incident-response.

Vulnerability scanning without remediation. Reports pile up. The scan is theater unless someone fixes findings.

Penetration test ignored. Pen test report sits on a shelf. Test results without remediation are worse than no test.

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Output format

A security baseline document includes:

• Inventory: what's in scope
• Layer-by-layer status: what's in place, what's missing
• Required headers: with values, applied per environment
• Required configurations: TLS, secrets, auth
• Required operational practices: access reviews, patch cadence, audit logging
• Findings: prioritized list of gaps
• Remediation plan: owners, dates
• Re-audit cadence: when this is reviewed next

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Reference files

• references/headers-checklist.md: A copy-paste checklist of recommended security headers with example values, organized by tier of importance.